O Impacto da Distância de Corrupção nas Estratégias de Posse De PMEs Espanholas e Portuguesas Outros Idiomas

ID:
49224
Resumo:
A estratégia de posse de subsidiárias no estrangeiro é uma importante decisão para empresas multinacionais (EMNs). Pesquisa anterior analisou o efeito de dimensões do país na estratégia de posse, quer do país de origem quer do país receptor. Neste artigo escrutinamos o efeito das diferenças entre o país de origem e o país receptor na estratégia de posse de EMNs. Empiricamente, analisamos a influência da distância de corrupção nas estratégias de posse de EMNs espanholas e portuguesas, usando dados de 3.941 subsidiárias no estrangeiro. Concluímos que quanto maior a distância de corrupção (em valor absoluto) entre Espanha (ou Portugal) e o país receptor, maior o nível de posse detido pela EMN. Contudo, quando o receptor é mais corrupto que o país de origem, as EMNs têm detêm um nível de posse mais baixo nas subsidiárias locais.
Citação ABNT:
FARIA, M. P.; CARVALHO, F.; REIS, N. R. The Impact of Corruption Distance on Ownership Strategies of Spanish and Portuguese MNEs. Revista Ibero-Americana de Estratégia, v. 17, n. 1, p. 15-30, 2018.
Citação APA:
Faria, M. P., Carvalho, F., & Reis, N. R. (2018). The Impact of Corruption Distance on Ownership Strategies of Spanish and Portuguese MNEs. Revista Ibero-Americana de Estratégia, 17(1), 15-30.
DOI:
10.5585/riae.v17i1.2603
Link Permanente:
http://www.spell.org.br/documentos/ver/49224/o-impacto-da-distancia-de-corrupcao-nas-estrategias-de-posse-de-pmes-espanholas-e-portuguesas/i/pt-br
Tipo de documento:
Artigo
Idioma:
Inglês
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