ID: 10938
Authors:
Daniel Ferreira Caixe, Elizabeth Krauter.
Source:
Revista Contabilidade & Finanças, v. 24, n. 62, p. 142-153, May-August, 2013. 12 page(s).
Keyword:
Corporate governance , Corporate market value , Generalized Method of Moments , Ownership and control structure
Document type: Article (Portuguese)
Show Abstract
The Brazilian model of corporate governance is characterized by a highly
concentrated ownership structure, which usually culminates in an
overlap between ownership and management. According to the literature,
the accumulation of shares by the controller(s) can affect corporate
performance due to both the alignment (or incentive) effect and the
entrenchment effect. At first, the presence of large shareholders is
associated with benefits for an organization because it increases the
effectiveness of management monitoring. However, very high levels of
ownership concentration can allow controllers to dominate the
corporation's decision-making process, which could result in the
expropriation of wealth from minority shareholders. The relevance of the
ownership structure as an internal mechanism of corporate governance
motivates the present study. This article aims to test whether ownership
and control concentration influences corporate market value. An
unbalanced panel was used for the period from 2001 to 2010, composed of
237 Brazilian non-financial publicly traded companies, totaling 1,199
observations. Dynamic regression models were used, estimated by the
System Generalized Method of Moments (Sys-GMM), to mitigate possible
sources of endogeneity, such as the omission of variables, the feedback
effect, and the simultaneity. A quadratic relationship was found between
cash flow rights of the largest shareholder and firm market value.
Moreover, the results indicate that the corrected market value of the
total shares held by the largest shareholder captured the incentive
effect, while voting rights concentration captured the entrenchment
effect.