ID: 9953
Authors:
Alba Valéria Moraes Amaral Rocha, Reinaldo Guerreiro.
Source:
Contabilidade, Gestão e Governança, v. 16, n. 1, p. 51-67, January-April, 2013. 17 page(s).
Keyword:
contracts , public service efficiency , regulatory agency , transaction costs
Document type: Article (Portuguese)
Show Abstract
This study discusses the efficiency of public sanitation services. Looking at operational services for repairing water and sewage lines, we sought to verify whether the introduction of regulation produced any impact on the level of efficiency observed. To this end, we started from the premise that the characteristics of the transaction, represented by the contracts entered into, are aligned with the Transaction Cost Economics approach (Williamson, 1985), in which a principal construct is that of asset specificity. Using as the object of research a company that provides basic sanitation services and whose transactions involve asset specificity, we sough to verify, using the logic of efficiency suggested by Williamson (1985), whether a better alignment between the characteristics of transactions, agents and laws reduces transaction costs. Data were collected by means of semi-structure interviews with contract managers and by content analysis of these contracts. Results suggest that the introduction of regulation in the sector did not affect transaction costs, but rather imposed new ex-post transactions costs by reason of the implicit contract established between the regulatory agency and the regulated company. The efficiency of contracted services, therefore, from the point of view of TCE is not altered by the introduction of regulation, but indirectly the rules of the regulatory agency were found to have the potential of strengthening ties between consumer and service provider. In this respect, the study is a contribution to the empirical literature on New Institutional Economics.