32224

Igor Bernardi Sonza
Gilberto de Oliveira Kloeckner

Revista Contabilidade & Finanças

O conflito de interesses entre executivos e proprietários é uma questão amplamente difundida na academia, já documentada em 1932 por Berle e Means, trazendo à tona o clássico conflito de interesses entre agente e principal discutido pela Teoria da Agência. A premissa por trás da governança corporativa é que as pessoas que estão dentro das corporações não necessariamente agem visando o melhor para os provedores de fundos. Partindo deste pressuposto, o trabalho em questão visa verificar a influência dos aspectos de governança corporativa na eficiência das empresas de capital aberto brasileiras. O estudo une técnicas de otimização estática através de Análise Envoltória de Dados (DEA) para identificar a eficiência das empresas de capital aberto, com Dados em Painel para identificar a influência da governança corporativa na eficiência das empresas. Os dados foram coletados manualmente dos relatórios 20-F da Security Exchange Commission(SEC) das empresas brasileiras que possuem American Depositary Receipts(ADRs), já que a base de dados não está disponível, no Brasil, de uma forma completa. Grande parte das hipóteses foi confirmada, evidenciando as condições particulares das finanças corporativas no Brasil no que tange a Governança Corporativa. A incipiência do mercado de capitais brasileiro é percebida em várias análises, ressaltando que o histórico do sistema corporativo brasileiro é um dos limitantes da eficiência das empresas. As condições que prevalecem são: (i) alta sobreposição propriedade-direção; (ii) conselhos de administração de baixa efetividade; (iii) em grupos familiares, os papéis dos acionistas, dos conselhos e da direção não são bem definidos; (iv) existe pouca clareza quanto à relação benefício-custo da boa governança; (v) baixa eficácia dos conselhos de administração; e (vi) indícios de conflitos de interesses, relativizados por incentivos explícitos e implícitos.

Eficiência, Governança corporativa, Teoria da agência

SONZA, I. B.; KLOECKNER, G. O. A Governança Corporativa influencia a eficiência das empresas brasileiras?. Revista Contabilidade & Finanças, v. 25, n. 65, p. 145-160, 2014.

Sonza, I. B., & Kloeckner, G. O. (2014). A Governança Corporativa influencia a eficiência das empresas brasileiras?. Revista Contabilidade & Finanças, 25(65), 145-160.

https://www.spell.org.br/documentos/ver/32224/a-governanca-corporativa-influencia-a-eficiencia-das-empresas-brasileiras-/i/pt-br

Artigo

Português

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