Título Inglês:
Comparing the Use of Forward-Looking and Contemporary Performance Measurement to Formulate Incentive Contracts in the Presence of the Horizon Problem: An Experimental Analysis
Resumo:
Este artigo compara o uso de mensuração forward-looking e contemporânea de desempenho em contratos de incentivo na presença do problema do horizonte. Para tanto, foi utilizado um experimento de fator único entre sujeitos, pré e pós-tratamento, com grupo de controle. A pesquisa teve a participação de 76 estudantes de graduação, divididos em 3 grupos, e registrou-se que, em comparação ao grupo de controle e ao grupo de tratamento vinculado à mensuração contemporânea de desempenho, os participantes submetidos ao contrato que recompensava com base na mensuração forward-looking agiram de modo mais congruente com o objetivo de longo prazo estabelecido para a tarefa experimental. Consistente com as predições da teoria da agência, o principal achado desta investigação sugere que o lucro econômico ajuda a mitigar o problema de miopia gerencial, indicando que incorporá-lo aos contratos motiva os agentes a agir de modo mais consistente com os objetivos de longo prazo da empresa, mesmo na presença do problema do horizonte. Além disso, a pesquisa registrou novas evidências da inadequação da formulação de contratos de incentivo baseados em medidas de desempenho distorcidas, tal como o lucro contábil.
Resumo Inglês:
This study compares the use of forward-looking and contemporary performance measurement in incentive contracts in the presence of the horizon problem. To do this, we used a single-factor experiment between pre- and post-treatment subjects, with a control group. The study had the participation of 76 undergraduate students, divided into 3 groups, and it registered that, when compared to the control group and the treatment group linked to contemporary performance measurement, the participants under the contract that rewarded having a forwardlooking measurement as a basis acted more congruently with the long-term goal set for the experimental task. Consistent with predictions of the agency theory, the main finding of this research suggests that economic profit helps mitigating the problem of managerial myopia, indicating that incorporate it to contracts motivates agents to act more consistently with the company’s long-term goals, even in the presence of the horizon problem. Besides, the study registered new evidence of the inadequacy of formulating incentive contracts having distorted performance measurements as a basis, such as book profit.
Citação ABNT:
SANTOS, L. P. G. D.Comparando o Uso de Mensuração Forward-Looking e Contemporânea de Desempenho na Formulação de Contratos de Incentivo Quando Existe o Problema do Horizonte: Uma Análise Experimental . Revista Contabilidade & Finanças, v. 26, n. 68, p. 195-207, 2015.
Citação APA:
Santos, L. P. G. D.(2015). Comparando o Uso de Mensuração Forward-Looking e Contemporânea de Desempenho na Formulação de Contratos de Incentivo Quando Existe o Problema do Horizonte: Uma Análise Experimental . Revista Contabilidade & Finanças, 26(68), 195-207.
DOI:
10.1590/1808-057x201501060
Link Permanente:
https://www.spell.org.br/documentos/ver/37061/comparando-o-uso-de-mensuracao-forward-looking-e-contemporanea-de-desempenho-na-formulacao-de-contratos-de-incentivo-quando-existe-o-problema-do-horizonte--uma-analise-experimental-/i/pt-br
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