Determinantes das despesas com serviços de auditoria e consultoria prestados pelo auditor independente no Brasil Outros Idiomas

ID:
9057
Resumo:
O objetivo desta pesquisa é identificar fatores que influenciem na determinação de gastos com auditoria e consultoria por parte das empresas brasileiras abertas. A principal motivação do presente estudo foi a falta de pesquisas sobre gastos com auditoria e consultoria no Brasil, enquanto que esse assunto já vem sendo explorado há anos em outros países. A escassez de dados no Brasil é devido ao fato de que, só a partir de 2009, tornou-se obrigatória a divulgação das quantias despendidas com serviços de auditoria e consultoria prestados pelo auditor independente. A divulgação desses dados possibilita a análise dos determinantes dos valores pagos pelas empresas por tais serviços. Vale ressaltar que, neste estudo, analisamos apenas os gastos com serviços de consultoria prestados pela mesma firma de auditoria, ou seja, não levamos em conta qualquer quantia despendida com outros consultores. Os resultados indicam que as despesas de auditoria estão positivamente relacionadas com o tamanho da companhia, qualidade da governança e com o fato de a empresa de auditoria ser uma Big Four. Já quanto aos gastos de consultoria, existe uma relação positiva com o tamanho da empresa e com Big Four, mas não existe relação significativa com governança.
Citação ABNT:
HALLAK, R. T. P.; SILVA, A. L. C. Determinantes das despesas com serviços de auditoria e consultoria prestados pelo auditor independente no Brasil. Revista Contabilidade & Finanças, v. 23, n. 60, p. 223-231, 2012.
Citação APA:
Hallak, R. T. P., & Silva, A. L. C. (2012). Determinantes das despesas com serviços de auditoria e consultoria prestados pelo auditor independente no Brasil. Revista Contabilidade & Finanças, 23(60), 223-231.
Link Permanente:
https://www.spell.org.br/documentos/ver/9057/determinantes-das-despesas-com-servicos-de-auditoria-e-consultoria-prestados-pelo-auditor-independente-no-brasil/i/pt-br
Tipo de documento:
Artigo
Idioma:
Português
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