48872

Vinícius Augusto Brunassi Silva
Richard Saito

RAUSP Management Journal

Quando uma empresa apresenta um plano de recuperação judicial, espera-se que o plano seja aprovado por seus credores. Neste artigo, apresenta-se a evidência empírica sobre a votação dos credores trabalhistas, com garantia real e quirografário e a probabilidade de aprovação do plano de recuperação judicial no Brasil. O estudo aborda uma análise descritiva das principais características dos planos de recuperação judicial por classe de voto. Utilizando uma amostra de 120 planos de recuperação judicial apresentados por empresas entre 2005 e 2014, os resultados sugerem que: credores trabalhistas estão propensos a aprovar o plano de recuperação mesmo quando o plano é rejeitado pelas demais classes; planos com propostas de pagamento mais heterogêneas para as três classes de credores possuem menor chance de serem aceitos; a chance de aprovação do plano diminui nos casos em que mais credores quirografários participam da votação; e planos com proposta de venda de ativos possuem maior chance de serem aprovados. Finalmente, maior concentração da dívida na classe com garantia real diminui a chance de aprovação do plano, e o contrário ocorre na classe quirografária.

Falência, Plano de recuperação, Recuperação de empresas

SILVA, V. A. B.; SAITO, R. Corporate Restructuring: Empirical Evidence on the Approval of the Reorganization Plan. RAUSP Management Journal, v. 53, n. 1, p. 49-62, 2018.

Silva, V. A. B., & Saito, R. (2018). Corporate Restructuring: Empirical Evidence on the Approval of the Reorganization Plan. RAUSP Management Journal, 53(1), 49-62.

10.1016/j.rauspm.2017.12.008

https://www.spell.org.br/documentos/ver/48872/reestruturacao-corporativa--evidencia-empirica-sobre-a-aprovacao-do-plano-de-reorganizacao/i/pt-br

Artigo

Inglês

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