Resumo:
Este trabalho tem por objetivo identificar quais são os efeitos causados pela divulgação de eventos de corrupção sobre o valor de mercado das empresas listadas na Bolsa de Valores brasileira. Para tanto, utilizou-se a metodologia de estudos de eventos, a fim de avaliar a influência da divulgação das fases de uma das maiores operações anticorrupção brasileira (Operação Lava Jato) sobre o retorno anormal acumulado das ações, tanto de companhias citadas nas investigações (envolvimento direto) quanto de companhias listadas nos setores das companhias citadas. Os resultados indicam que a Lava Jato reduziu o valor de mercado das empresas diretamente envolvidas com os escândalos de corrupção acima de variações que ocorreram no mercado. Já, para as demais empresas dos setores envolvidos, evidenciou-se um efeito positivo sobre o retorno anormal acumulado. Tais resultados sugerem que a deflagração de operações anticorrupção como a Lava Jato tem potencial para reduzir diferenças de precificação existentes entre empresas que participam diretamente de contratos fraudulentos e demais empresas do mesmo setor. Tal ajuste de precificação pode estar associado à correção feita pelo mercado mediante os prejuízos trazidos pela concorrência desleal à competitividade.
Resumo Inglês:
This paper aims to identify the effects of the disclosure of corruption events on the market values of companies listed on the Brazilian Stock Exchange. For this purpose, we applied the event studies methodology to evaluate the influence of exposing the phases of one of the most extensive Brazilian anti-corruption operations - the Lava Jato Operation - on the cumulative abnormal return of shares, both of the companies cited in the investigations (direct involvement) and of those listed in the same segments as the cited companies. Results indicate that the Lava Jato Operation reduced the market values of the companies directly involved in the corruption scandals above market variations. For the other companies in the concerned segments, there was a positive effect on the cumulative abnormal returns. Such results suggest that the onset of anti-corruption operations such as the Lava Jato Operation has the potential to reduce pricing differences that exist between companies that directly participate in fraudulent contracts and other companies in the same segments. This pricing adjustment may be associated with the correction made by the market due to losses in competiveness caused by unfair competition.
Citação ABNT:
ARAÚJO, E. C. C.; RODRIGUES, V. R. D. S.; MONTE-MOR, D. S.; CORREIA, R. D. Corrupção e Valor de Mercado: Os Efeitos da Operação Lava Jato sobre o Mercado de Ações no Brasil . Revista Catarinense da Ciência Contábil, v. 17, n. 51, p. 41-58, 2018.
Citação APA:
Araújo, E. C. C., Rodrigues, V. R. D. S., Monte-mor, D. S., & Correia, R. D. (2018). Corrupção e Valor de Mercado: Os Efeitos da Operação Lava Jato sobre o Mercado de Ações no Brasil . Revista Catarinense da Ciência Contábil, 17(51), 41-58.
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