46967

Michele Rílany Rodrigues Machado
Ivan Ricardo Gartner

Revista Contemporânea de Contabilidade

This research examined if Cressey’s (1953) fraud triangle and the agency theory, jointly, enables investigate corporate fraud occurrence in Brazilian banking institutions. It was formulated six research hypotheses were segregated in fraud triangle – pressure, opportunity and rationalization – and measured by variables taken from the agency theory, criminology and empirical papers on corporate fraud. The identification of probability of fraud occurrence was operationalized from multinomial logistic model, applied to data of 44 banking, for the period between January 2001 and December 2012. For element pressure, hypotheses No. 01 was confirmed, since this showed that the lower an institution’s previous performance, the greater probability there is of fraudulent events occurring in the future. In the element of opportunity, the hypothesis No. 03 was confirmed, which showed that low corporate governance indicators increased the possibility of fraud occurrences. In rationalization element, the hypothesis No. 08 was confirmed, therefore, the predominance of women in management reduces the probability of fraud. We thereby conclude that Cressey’s Triangle, when combined with the theory of agency is an appropriate research instrument to use when carrying out an investigation into corporate fraud occurrence in banking institutions.

Banking Institutions, Corporate Fraud, Economic Crime, Fraud Triangle, Theory of Agency

MACHADO, M. R. R.; GARTNER, I. R. Triângulo de Fraudes de Cressey (1953) e Teoria da Agência: Estudo Aplicado a Instituições Bancárias Brasileiras . Revista Contemporânea de Contabilidade, v. 14, n. 32, p. 108-140, 2017.

Machado, M. R. R., & Gartner, I. R. (2017). Triângulo de Fraudes de Cressey (1953) e Teoria da Agência: Estudo Aplicado a Instituições Bancárias Brasileiras . Revista Contemporânea de Contabilidade, 14(32), 108-140.

http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/2175-8069.2017v14n32p108

https://www.spell.org.br/documentos/ver/46967/cressey---s-fraud-triangle--1953--and-agency-theory--study-applied-to-brazilian-banking-institutions--/i/en

Artigo

Português

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