39859

Lélis Pedro de Andrade
Aureliano Angel Bressan
Robert Aldo Iquiapaza

Revista Brasileira de Finanças

Objetivou-se neste trabalho identificar se existe relação entre a emissão de duas classes de ações, a existência de estrutura piramidal de controle e o desempenho financeiro das empresas brasileiras. Para tanto, utilizaram-se testes univariados e modelos de dados em painel para um período amostral entre 2000 a 2012. Os resultados indicam que é negativa a influência que a emissão de duas classes de ações exerce sobre o desempenho financeiro, independente do fato de a empresa possuir ou não estrutura piramidal. Já a estrutura piramidal de controle exerce um efeito positivo, desde que a empresa não possua ações sem direito a voto, e que não seja elevada a quantidade de camadas existentes até o último nível da estrutura. Estes resultados sugerem que a concessão do poder de voto e a estrutura piramidal de controle com um número reduzido de camadas são fatores relevantes que influenciam positivamente o desempenho financeiro das empresas brasileiras de capital aberto.

desempenho financeiro, emissão de duas classes de ações, estrutura piramidalde controle

ANDRADE, L. P.; BRESSAN, A. A.; IQUIAPAZA, R. A. Estrutura Piramidal de Controle, Emissão de Duas Classes de Ações e Desempenho Financeiro das Empresas Brasileiras . Revista Brasileira de Finanças, v. 12, n. 4, p. 555-595, 2014.

Andrade, L. P., Bressan, A. A., & Iquiapaza, R. A. (2014). Estrutura Piramidal de Controle, Emissão de Duas Classes de Ações e Desempenho Financeiro das Empresas Brasileiras . Revista Brasileira de Finanças, 12(4), 555-595.

https://www.spell.org.br/documentos/ver/39859/estrutura-piramidal-de-controle--emissao-de-duas-classes-de-acoes-e-desempenho-financeiro-das-empresas-brasileiras-/i/pt-br

Artigo

Português

Adams, Renee; Ferreira, Daniel. One Share-One Vote: The Empirical Evidence. Review of Finance, v. 12, p. 51-91. 2008.

Aldrighi, Dante M.; Diaz, Maria D. M.; Postali, Fernando A. S. Pyramidal Ownership Structures in Companies and Corporate Governance in Brazil: The Role of Novo Mercado. Disponıvel em https://www.econbiz.de/Record/pyramidal-ownership-structures-in-companies-and-corporate-governance-in-brazil-the-role-of-novo-mercado-aldrighi-dante-mendes/10009696226. Acesso em 4 de Agosto de2014. 2012.

Aldrighi, Dante M.; Mazzer Neto, Roberto. Estrutura de Propriedade e de Controle Das Empresas de Capital Aberto No Brasil. Revista de Economia Política, 25, 115-137. 2005.

Aldrighi, Dante M.; Mazzer Neto, Roberto. Evidências Sobre as Estruturas de Propriedade de Capital e de Voto Das Empresas de Capital Aberto No Brasil. Revista Brasileira de Economia, v. 61, p. 129-152. 2007.

Aldrighi, Dante; Postali, Fernando A. S. Propriedade Piramidal Das Empresas No Brasil. Revista Economia, v. 12, p. 27-48. 2011.

Almeida, Heitor; Park, Sang Y.; Subrahmanyam, Marti; Wolfenzon, Daniel. The Structure and Formation of Business Groups: Evidence from Korean Chaebols. Disponıvel em: http://people.stern.nyu.edu/msubrahm/papers/Pyramids.pdf. Acesso em 5 de Abril de2014. 2010.

Almeida, Heitor; Wolfenzon, Daniel. Should Business Groups Be Dismantled? The Equilibrium Costs of Efficient Internal Capital Markets. Journal of Financial Economics, v. 79, p. 99-44. 2006.

Andrade, Lelis P.; Bressan, Aureliano A.; Iquiapaza, Robert A. Mecanismos de Alavancagem Do Poder de Voto, Efetividade Do Conselho de Administração e O Desempenho Financeiro Das Empresas Brasileiras. Disponıvel em http://www.ibgc.org.br/userfiles/files/vencedor_Academia__1o_Lugar_2014.pdf. Acesso em 16 de Dezembro de2014. 2014.

Bebchuk, Lucian A.; Kraakman, Reinier; Triantis, George. Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity: The Creation and Agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash Flow Rights. Disponıvel em http://www.nber.org/papers/w6951. Acesso em 10 de Dezembro de2014. 2000.

Bena, Jan; Ortiz-Molina, Hernan. Pyramidal Ownership and Creation of New Firms. Journal of Financial Economics, v. 108, p. 798-821. 2013.

Bennedsen, Morten; Nielsen, Kasper M. Incentive and Entrenchment Effects in European Ownership. Journal of Banking and Finance, v. 34, p. 2212-2229. 2010.

Bertrand, Marianne; Paras, Mehta; Mullainathan, Sendhil. Ferreting Out Tunnelling: An Application to Indian Business Groups. Quarterly Journal of Economics, v. 117, p. 1047-1073. 2002.

Bigelli, Marco; Mehrotra, Vikas; Rau, P. Raghavendra. Why are Shareholders Not Paid to Give Up their Voting Privileges? Unique Evidence from Italy. Journal of Corporate Finance, v. 17, p. 1619-1635. 2011.

Black, Bernard S.; Carvalho, Antonio G.; Sampaio, Joelson O. The Evolution of Corporate Governance in Brazil. Emerging Markets Review, v. 20, p. 176-195. 2014.

Bortolon, Patrícia M.; Leal, Ricardo P. C. 2010. Determinantes Da Estrutura Piramidal de Controle. In 10° Encontro Brasileiro de Finanças, 2010, São Paulo. 10° Encontro Brasileiro de Finanças.

Bortolon, Patrícia M.; Leal, Ricardo P. C. Dual-Class Unifications and Corporate Governance in Brazil. Emerging Markets Review, v. 20, p. 89- 108. 2014.

Bortolon, Patrícia M. Por Que as Empresas Brasileiras Adotam Estruturas Piramidais de Controle. BASE - Revista de Administração e Contabilidade da Unisinos, v. 10, p. 2-18. 2013.

Braga-Alves, Marcus V.; Shastri, Kuldeep. Corporate Governance, Valuation, and Performance: Evidence from a Voluntary Market Reform in Brazil. Financial Management, v. 139-157. 2011.

Burkart, Mike; Lee, Samuel. One Share-One Vote: The Theory. Review of Finance, v. 12, p. 1-49. 2008.

Byun, Hae-Young, Choi, Sunhwa, Hwang, Lee-Seok; Kim, Robert G. Business Group Affiliation, Ownership Structure, and the Cost of Debt. Journal of Corporate Finance, v. 23, p. 311-331. 2013.

Cameron, Allrich C.; Trivedi, Pravin K. Microeconometrics Using Stata. Texas: Stata Press. 2010.

Chung, Kee H.; Pruitt, Stephen W. A Simple Approximation of Tobin’s. Financial Management, v. 23, p. 70-74. 1994.

Claessens, Stijn; Djankov, Simeon; Lang, Larry H. P. The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations. Journal of Financial Economics, v. 58, p. 81-112. 2000.

Claessens, Stijn; Feyen, Erik E.; Laeven, Luc. Political Connections and Preferential Access to Finance: The Role of Campaign Contributions. Journal of Financial Economics, v. 88, p. 554-580. 2008.

Faccio, Mara; Lang, Larry H. P. The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corporations. Journal of Financial Economics, v. 65, p. 365-695. 2002.

Fan, Joseph P. H.; Wei, John K. C.; Xu, Xinzhong. Corporate Finance and Governance in Emerging Markets: A Selective Review and an Agenda for Future Research. Journal of Corporate Finance, v. 17, p. 207- 214. 2011.

Gompers, Paul A.; Ishii, Joy L.; Metrick, Andrew. Extreme Governance: An Analysis of Dual-Class Firms in the United States. The Review of Financial Studies, v. 23, p. 1051-1088. 2010.

Gorga, Erica. Changing the Paradigm of Stock Ownership from Concentrated Towards Dispersed Ownership? Evidence from Brazil and Consequences for Emerging Countries. Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business, v. 29, p. 439-554. 2009.

Granovetter, Mark. Business Groups and Social Organization. In The Handbook of Economic Sociology. 2 ed. N. Smelser e R. Swedberg. Disponıvel em: https://www.stanford.edu/dept/soc/people/mgranovetter/documents/granhandbookeconsocio_000.pdf. Acesso em 2 de marco de2014. 2005.

Jensen, Michael C.; Meckling, William. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics, p. 305-360. 1976.

Jim, Kyuho; Park, Choelsson. Separation of Cash Flow and Voting Rights and Firm Performance in Large Family Groups in Korea. Corporate Governance: An International Review. 52p. Disponível em: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/corg.12102/pdf. Acesso em 18/01/2015. 2015.

Johnson, Simon; La Porta, Rafael; Lopez-de Silanes, Florencio; Shleifer, Andrei. Tunneling. American Economic Review, v. 90, p. 22-27. 2000.

Khanna, Tarun; Palepu, Krishna. Is Group Affiliation Profitable in Emerging Markets?, An Analysis of Diversified Indian Business Groups. Journal of Finance, v. 55, p. 867-891. 2000.

Khanna, Tarun; Rivkin, Jan W. Estimating the Performance Effects of Business Groups in Emerging Markets. Strategic Management Journal, v. 54, p. 45-74. 2001.

Khanna, Tarun; Yafeh, Y. Business Groups in Emerging Markets: Paragons or Parasites? Journal of Economic Literature, v. 45, p. 331-372. 2007.

Laeven, Luc; Levine, Ross. Complex Ownership Structures and Corporate Valuations. The Review of Financial Studies, v. 21, p. 579-604. 2008.

La Porta, Rafael; Lopez-de Silanes, Florencio; Shleifer, Andrei; Vishny, Robert. Investor Protection and Corporate Governance. Journal of Financial Economics, v. 58, p. 3-27. 2000.

La Porta, Rafael; Shleifer, Andrei; Lopez-de Silanes, Florencio. Corporate Ownership Around the World. The Journal of Finance, v. 54, p. 471-517. 1999.

Leal, Ricardo P. C.; Carvalhal-Da-Silva, Andre´ L.; Valadares, Silvia M. Estrutura de Controle Das Companhias Brasileiras de Capital Aberto. Revista de Administração Contemporânea, v. 6, p. 7-18. 2002.

Lins, Karl V. Equity Ownership and Firm Value in Emerging Markets. Journal of Financial and Qunatitative Analysis, v. 38, p. 159-84. 2003.

Masulis, Ronald W.; Pham, Peter K.; Zein, Jason. Family Business Groups Around the World: Financing Advantages, Control Motivations, and Organizational Choices. Review of Financial Studies, v. 24, p. 3556- 3600. 2011.

Maury, Benjamin; Pajuste, Anete. Privates Benefits of Control and Dual-Class Share Unifications. Managerial and Decision Economics, v. 32, p. 355-369. 2011.

Morck, Randall; Wolfenzon, Daniel; Yeung, Bernard. Corporate Governance, Economic Entrenchment, and Growth. Journal of Economic Literature, v. 43, p. 655-720. 2005.

Morck, Randall; Yeung, Bernard. Family Control and the RentSeeking Society. Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice, v. 28, p. 391-409. 2004.

Murphy, Kevin M.; Andrei, Shleifer; Vishny Robert, W. The Allocation of Talent: Implications for Growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics, v. CVI, p. 503-530. 1991.

Murphy, Kevin M.; Shleifer, Andrei; Vishny, Robert W. Why is Rent-Seeking Costly to Growth? American Economic Review, v. 82, p. 409- 414. 1993.

Paligorova, Teodora; Xu, Zhaoxia. 2012. Complex Ownership and Capital Structure. Journal of Corporate Finance, v. 18, p. 701-716.

Schaffer, Mark E.; Stillman, S. Xtoverid: Stata Module to Calculate Tests of Overidentifying Restrictions After Xtreg, Xtivreg, Xtivreg2 and Xthtaylor. Disponıvel em: http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s456779.html. Acesso em 20 de fevereiro de2014. 2010.

Shleifer, Andrei; Vishny, Robert W. A Survey of Corporate Governance. The Journal of Finance, v. 52, p. 737-783. 1997.

Silva, Andre L. C.; Leal, Ricardo P. C. Ownership, Control, Valuation and Performance of Brazilian Corporation. Corporate Ownership & Control, v. 4, p. 300-308. 2006.

Silva, Andre L. C.; Subrahmanyam, Avanidhar. Dual-Class Premium, Corporate Governance, and the Mandatory Bid Rule: Evidence from the Brazilian Stock Market. Journal of Corporate Finance, v. 13, p. 1-24. 2007.

Valadares, Sılvia M.; Leal, Ricardo P. C. Ownership and Control Structure of Brazilian Companies. Revista Abante, v. 3, p. 29-56. 2000.

Verne, Renata M.; Santos, Rafael L.; Postali, Fernando. Estruturas de Propriedade Piramidais e Seus Efeitos Sobre O Valor de Mercado Das Companhias Brasileiras Que Abriram Capital No Período 2004-2007. Disponıvel em: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1423585. Acesso em 22/12/2014. 2009.

Villalonga, Belén; Amit, Raphael. How are US Family Firms Controlled? Review of Financial Studies, v. 22, p. 3047-3091. 2009.

White, Halbert. A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity. Econometrica, v. 48, p. 817-830. 1980.