Transparência do Banco Central e mercado financeiro: evidências para o caso brasileiro Outros Idiomas

ID:
4528
Resumo:
O principal objetivo deste artigo é uma análise empírica dos efeitos da transparência do Banco Central do Brasil sobre o mercado financeiro brasileiro. Além disso, é apresentada uma pequena revisão da literatura sobre a transparência do banco central. São examinados os impactos das diferentes dimensões da transparência da autoridade monetária na curva de juros. Ademais, os efeitos oriundos de variações no risco país são considerados neste estudo. Os resultados mostram que a transparência do Banco Central do Brasil serve como um guia para o mercado de juros futuros e que as diferentes dimensões da transparência contribuem para uma maior eficiência do mercado.
Citação ABNT:
MENDONÇA, H. F.; SIMÃO FILHO, J. Transparência do Banco Central e mercado financeiro: evidências para o caso brasileiro. Revista Brasileira de Finanças, v. 9, n. 1, art. 170, p. 51-67, 2011.
Citação APA:
Mendonça, H. F., & Simão Filho, J. (2011). Transparência do Banco Central e mercado financeiro: evidências para o caso brasileiro. Revista Brasileira de Finanças, 9(1), 51-67.
Link Permanente:
https://www.spell.org.br/documentos/ver/4528/transparencia-do-banco-central-e-mercado-financeiro--evidencias-para-o-caso-brasileiro/i/pt-br
Tipo de documento:
Artigo
Idioma:
Português
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