Resumo:
Este artigo analisa os principais meios de reorganização adotados pelas empresas em recuperação judicial no Brasil à luz do artigo 50 da lei judicial coletados entre
2006 e 2018. Por meio de análise descritiva e com a utilização de testes de diferença entre médias e proporções e regressão logística, encontramos que a venda de ativos é
um dos principais meios de reorganização adotados pelas empresas. Operações de renovação de dívidas, fusões e aquisições também são bastante utilizadas nas estratégias dereestruturação. Por fim, aferimos relação positiva entre dívida e a utilização de meios de reorganização que constituem nova injeção de recursos financeiros na empresa, como fusões, aumento de capital social, venda de bens e emissão de valores mobiliários.
Resumo Inglês:
We investigate the principal means of restructuring adopted by Brazilian companies in judicial recovery, according to Article 50 of Bankruptcy Law 11,101/05. Using a sample of 622 corporate reorganization plans from 2006 to 2018 for descriptive analysis, tests of differences between means and proportions, and logistic regression, we show that asset sales are companies' primary means of reorganization. Debt renewal, mergers, and acquisitions are also widely used. We confirm a positive relationship between level of debt and methods of restructuring that inject new resources into the company, such as mergers, capital increases, asset sales, and the issue of securities.
Citação ABNT:
GROSSERT, R. R.; SILVA, V. A. B.; NETTO, H. G.; SAMPAIO, J. Quais os principais mecanismos dereorganização adotados pelas empresas brasileiras em recuperação judicial?. Revista Brasileira de Finanças, v. 20, n. 4, art. 4, p. 0-0, 2022.
Citação APA:
Grossert, R. R., Silva, V. A. B., Netto, H. G., & Sampaio, J. (2022). Quais os principais mecanismos dereorganização adotados pelas empresas brasileiras em recuperação judicial?. Revista Brasileira de Finanças, 20(4), 0-0.
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