Título Inglês:
Reelection incentives and political budget cycle: evidence from Brazil
Resumo:
Este artigo testa a presença de ciclo político-orçamentário (CPO) nas eleições municipais no Brasil e checa se prefeitos que adotam tal política têm maiores chances de reeleição. Baseado em dados eleitorais e fiscais de 5.406 municípios brasileiros e aplicando o método econométrico de diferença-em-diferenças e também regressões logísticas, os resultados fornecem alguma evidência de CPO no Brasil, apesar de sua magnitude e consistência variar dependendo dos anos utilizados como anos eleitorais e não eleitorais. Em média, prefeitos reelegíveis gastam em torno de 3% a mais em anos eleitorais em comparação a prefeitos não reelegíveis. Indo além, reelegíveis que de fato concorrem à reeleição apresentam uma variação no gasto que é quase 5% superior à variação dos não reelegíveis e não concorrentes. Adicionalmente, os resultados sugerem que prefeitos que aumentam os gastos em anos eleitorais têm maiores chances de reeleição, contanto que tal aumento seja feito dentro de limites de déficit aceitáveis pelos eleitores.
Resumo Inglês:
This article tests the presence of political budget cycle (PBC) in municipal elections in Brazil and checks whether mayors who adopt such policy have greater probability of reelection. Based on fiscal and electoral data of 5,406 Brazilian municipalities and applying the difference-in-differences econometric method as well as logistic regressions, the results provide some evidence of PBC in Brazil, although its magnitude and consistency varies depending on the years used as electoral and non-electoral years. On average, reelectable mayors spend close to 3% more in election years than nonreelectables. Moreover, reelectables who do run for reelection present a variation in spending which is close to 5% superior to that of non-reelectables and non-runners. Additionally, the results suggest that mayors who increase public spending during electoral periods have greater chances of being reelected, as long as such spending is done within deficit limits acceptable by voters.
Citação ABNT:
KLEIN, F. A.Reelection incentives and political budget cycle: evidence from Brazil. Revista de Administração Pública, v. 44, n. 2, p. 283-337, 2010.
Citação APA:
Klein, F. A.(2010). Reelection incentives and political budget cycle: evidence from Brazil. Revista de Administração Pública, 44(2), 283-337.
Link Permanente:
https://www.spell.org.br/documentos/ver/2283/incentivos-da-reeleicao-e-ciclo-politico-orcamentario--evidencia-do-brasil/i/pt-br
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