60871

Daniela Albuquerque
Ana Isabel Morais
Inês Pinto

Revista Brasileira de Gestão de Negócios

Objetivo – O objetivo do presente artigo é analisar o efeito do nível de poder de supervisão sobre o nível de divulgação das provisões para perdas com empréstimos e sobre o uso deste elemento para fins de suavização de receita. Metodologia – Nossa amostra inclui 60 bancos europeus de 15 países, para o período entre 2012 e 2015. Utilizamos um índice baseado na mensuração do poder de supervisão e estimamos três modelos de regressão a fim de investigar o papel da supervisão bancária na divulgação do risco de crédito e uso das provisões para perdas com empréstimos para fins de suavização de receita. Resultados – Os resultados mostram que os bancos de países com maior nível de poder de supervisão divulgam mais informações sobre provisões para perdas com empréstimos. Os resultados, no entanto, mostram que os bancos de países com maior nível de poder de supervisão apenas divulgam mais informações sobre o Pilar 3 e não de acordo com a IFRS 7. Além disso, concluímos que a discrição gerencial é menor em bancos domiciliados em países em que a aplicação conte com níveis altos. Contribuições – Este estudo é útil para os supervisores bancários, pois aumenta a conscientização sobre sua influência na divulgação de perdas por redução ao valor recuperável em ativos financeiros, e para os usuários das demonstrações financeiras, pois são fornecidas informações sobre a relação entre poder de supervisão e suavização de receita.

Basileia, Provisões para perdas com empréstimos, risco de crédito, suavização de receita, supervisão bancária

ALBUQUERQUE, D.; MORAIS, A. I.; PINTO, I. O Papel da Supervisão Bancária nas Divulgações de Risco de Crédito e Provisões para Perdas com Empréstimos. Revista Brasileira de Gestão de Negócios, v. 22, n. 4, p. 932-948, 2020.

Albuquerque, D., Morais, A. I., & Pinto, I. (2020). O Papel da Supervisão Bancária nas Divulgações de Risco de Crédito e Provisões para Perdas com Empréstimos. Revista Brasileira de Gestão de Negócios, 22(4), 932-948.

https://doi.org/10.7819/rbgn.v22i4.4078

https://www.spell.org.br/documentos/ver/60871/o-papel-da-supervisao-bancaria-nas-divulgacoes-de-risco-de-credito-e-provisoes-para-perdas-com-emprestimos/i/pt-br

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